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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The nature of the case, statement of facts and course of proceedings are
set forth in the Respondent's Brief and are incorporated herein by reference.
The state submits this Supplemental Respondent's Brief to address Hochrein's
claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that the district court violated his
constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial by "accept[ing] a factual
stipulation entered into by Mr. Hochrein's counsel that relieved the State of its
burden of proof as to essential elements of the charged offense without
obtaining Mr. Hochrein's personal waiver of his right to a jury determination as to
these elements."

(Supplemental Brief Of Appellant (hereinafter Supp. brief),

p.2.)
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ARGUMENT
Hochrein Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Showing That The District Court
Committed Fundamental Error By Accepting The Parties' Factual Stipulation
Without First Obtaining An On-The-The Record Waiver Of Hochrein's
Constitutional Right To A JUry Trial

A.

Introduction
Hochrein was charged with violating a no contact order that prohibited him

from having contact with Tanya Lewis. (#38317 R., pp.33-34,64-66, 101-03.) At
trial, the parties stipulated to the following facts:
On January 28, 2010, a No Contact Order issued by a Court
was in effect in Case No. CR2009-0002146. The No Contact
Order was issued because the Defendant, Edward R. Hochrein, Jr.,
had been charged with or convicted of an offense for which the
Court found that a No Contact Order was appropriate. The No
Contact Order prohibited the Defendant from contacting Tanya
Lewis. The No Contact Order also prohibited the Defendant from
being at Ms. Lewis' residence.
(State's Trial Exhibit 3A; Trial Tr., p.117, LS.17 -23, p.223, L.22 - p.224, L.18.)
The written stipulation was signed by defense counsel and the prosecutor and
was read to the jury and admitted as an exhibit at trial. (State's Trial Exhibit 3A;
Trial Tr., p.223, L.22 - p.224, L.18.) Although Hochrein agreed, by way of the
stipulation, that a no contact order had been issued and was in effect on the date
of the charged offense, he presented an alibi defense (see generally Trial Tr.,
pp.225-70 (testimony of alibi witnesses)) and argued, through counsel, that he
never had contact with Ms. Lewis on the date charged (see Trial Tr., p.133, L.23
- p.141, L.14 (defense counsel representing during opening statement both that
only issue before jury was whether Hochrein was the person who was at Ms.
Lewis' residence on January 28

th

and that evidence would not support such
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finding), p.303, L.23 - p.327, L.18 (defense counsel arguing during closing that
only issue before jury, "really," was whether "Hochrein [was] outside the door at
Tanya Lewis' apartment on January 28 th " and that evidence did not support such
finding)).

The jury ultimately rejected Hochrein's alibi defense and found him

guilty of violating the no contact order. (#38317 R., pp.130-31.)
For first time on appeal, Hochrein argues that the district court erred by
accepting the parties' factual stipulation without first conducting an on-the-record
discussion of the stipulation with Hochrein and obtaining from him a personal
waiver of his right to a jury determination of the facts addressed by the
stipulation. (Supp. brief, pp.3-9.) According to Hochrein, because the stipulation
was, in effect, an admission to several elements of the charged crime, the district
court was required to advise him of the constitutional rights he was waiving and
to obtain from him an explicit waiver of his right to a jury determination on each
element of the crime charged. (Id.) The failure to do so, Hochrein contends,
amounted to either structural or fundamental error and deprived Hochrein of his
constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial. (Id.)
Hochrein's argument is without merit. Unlike a guilty plea, an evidentiary
stipulation that admits only some of the elements required for a conviction does
not trigger a duty on the part of the trial court to obtain from the defendant an
express waiver of the right to a jury determination on those elements. Because
neither due process nor the right to a jury trial are even implicated by such
stipulations, Hochrein's argument that the district court committed fundamental
error by accepting the stipulation in this case without first obtaining an express
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waiver from Hochrein of his right to a jury determination of each of the essential
elements of the crime necessarily fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved

for appeal through an objection at triaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Absent a timely objection, the appellate
courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental error
doctrine. kL at 227, 245 P.3d at 979.

C.

Hochrein Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error
Hochrein argues that, by accepting the parties' factual stipulation without

ever obtaining from Hochrein a personal waiver of his right to a jury
determination of the essential elements of the crime covered by the stipulation,
"the district court violated Mr. Hochrein's well-established constitutional rights to
due process and a fair triaL" (Supp. brief, p.5.). Because Hochrein did not raise
this issue below he bears the burden on appeal of demonstrating fundamental
error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). Review
under the fundamental error doctrine requires Hochrein to demonstrate that the
error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." kL at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
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Contrary to Hochrein's assertions on appeal, his claim of fundamental error fails
on all three of the elements required by Perry.
First, Hochrein has failed to demonstrate that the error he alleges violated
one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights. Hochrein cites a number of
cases standing for the general proposition that, in every criminal trial, the state
carries the burden of proving every essential element of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Supp. brief, p.5 (citing, inter alia, Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979); State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942, 188
P.3d 867, 884 (2008); State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685, 227 P.3d 933, 939
(Ct. App. 2010).)

He also cites cases holding that the right to a jury

determination as to the essential elements of the charged offense is personal to
the defendant and, as such, defense counsel may not waive such right on the
defendant's behalf, either by stipulating to the truth of all of the facts necessary
for a conviction or enhancement of the charged offense, or by otherwise waiving
altogether the defendant's right to a jury trial.

(See Supp. brief, pp.6-8 (citing

State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413, 80 P.3d 349 (Ct. App. 2003) (admission to
truth of persistent violator enhancement); State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 703
P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1985) (waiver of jury trial).) Hochrein, however, has failed to
cite a single case that stands for the proposition he advocates in this case - i.e.,
that where the parties at trial stipulate to some, but not all, of the facts necessary
for conviction of the charged offense, due process demands the trial court to
conduct an on-the-record inquiry and obtain from the defendant a personal
waiver of his or her right to a jury determination of each fact covered by the
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stipulation. While Idaho's appellate courts have never considered the issue, a
review of cases from

other jurisdictions supports exactly the opposite

proposition.
In United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 836 (9

th

Cir. 1980), for

example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a claim, similar to that made
by Hochrein in this case, that the trial court erred by accepting a factual
stipulation without first questioning the defendant "personally as to the
voluntariness of any stipulation of crucial fact."

The stipulation at issue was

signed by defense counsel and admitted "to only two elements of one of the
offenses with which [Ferreboeuf] was charged."

kL

Given these circumstances,

and citing its earlier opinion in United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d 558, 561 n.3
(9

th

Cir. 1975), the Ferreboeuf court declined to adopt a rule requiring the trial

court to ascertain from the defendant personally whether the stipulation was
voluntarily given, noting that "[s]uch a rule would needlessly delay and confuse
the conduct of a typical triaL" Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d at 836. Instead, the court
held:
[W]hen a stipulation to a crucial fact is entered into the record in
open court in the presence of the defendant, and is agreed to by
defendant's acknowledged counsel, the trial court may reasonably
assume that the defendant is aware of the content of the stipulation
and agrees to it through his or her attorney. Unless a criminal
defendant indicates objection at the time the stipulation is made, he
or she is ordinarily bound by such stipulation.

kL (citations omitted).
Following Ferreboeuf, the Ninth Circuit held in Adams v. Peterson, 968
F.2d 835 (9

th

Cir. 1992), that the due process protections attendant to the entry
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of a formal guilty plea do not extend to stipulations of fact, even where those
stipulations admit essential elements of the charged crime. Adams was charged
with rape, burglary and sodomy. 1.9.:. at 836. At trial, the parties stipulated to a
number of facts, all of which were necessary for Adams' conviction of the
charged offenses. 1.9.:. at 836-37. On appeal from the dismissal of his habeas
petition following his convictions, Adams argued that "his stipulation of facts at
trial constituted a de facto guilty plea and that he was therefore entitled to the
procedural protections attendant to the entering of such a plea." 1.9.:. at 839.
Specifically, like Hochrein, Adams claimed a due process right to be advised by
the judge in open court of his constitutional rights, including the right to be tried
by a jury; and, he claimed, "the court had a constitutional obligation to establish
on the record that he voluntarily and intelligently waived these rights." 1.9.:. (citing
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)) (footnote omitted).

The Ninth

Circuit disagreed, reasoning:
Adams never stipulated that he was guilty of the crimes of
burglary, rape, and sodomy; in fact, Adams pled not guilty to all
three counts on which he was convicted by the trial court. Adams
only stipulated that the enumerated facts were supported beyond a
reasonable doubt by the evidence that the state possessed and
would present at trial. A stipulation to facts from which a judge or
jury may infer guilt is simply not the same as a stipulation to guilt, or
a guilty plea. "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which
admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction;
nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment."
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711. If the Boykin Court itself
recognized this distinction, then we are hardly in a position to
ignore it - or to hold that the full Boykin protections extend to the
circumstance of a stipulation.

1.9.:. (emphasis original) (footnote omitted).
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In rejecting Adams' claim that he was entitled to the full constitutional
protections that attend the entry of a guilty plea, the Ninth Circuit referred
specifically to its prior decision in United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d 558 (9 th Cir.
1975), wherein the court held that the procedural requirements of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which apply to guilty pleas, do not apply to
factual stipulations. Adams, 968 F.2d at 839-40. The Terrack court explained
that, to read the rule otherwise "would unduly encumber trials now often
shortened by stipulation of evidence and [stipulations] to identify exhibits, to
specify the chain of custody, and other important matters. To require a Rule 11
examination on every stipulation containing a vital admission of the defendant
would add ritualistic formalities where none are needed nor required." Terrack,
515 F.2d at 561 n.3, quoted in Adams, 968 F.2d at 840.
Because the procedural requirements of Rule 11 are merely a codification
of the constitutional requirements for a valid guilty plea set out in Boykin, the
Adams court concluded that the rationale of Terrack was equally applicable to
and dispositive of Adams' constitutional claim.

Adams, 968 F.2d at 840-41.

That rationale was echoed by Judge Kozinski who, in his concurring opinion in
Adams, agreed with the majority's conclusion that a formal guilty plea is
necessary to trigger the due process requirements of Boykin, explaining that
such conclusion is mandated, at least in part, by the realities of trial:
Criminal prosecutions put a variety of facts at issue, but quite often
only a few are genuinely in dispute. Stipulating to anyone of those
facts - or agreeing to any procedural shortcut, for that matter - can
fairly be characterized as giving up the defendant's substantial
rights, perhaps even as tantamount to a guilty plea.
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With the benefit of hindsight, a tactical concession might well
look like a major turning point in the case, one which made the
outcome a foregone conclusion.
Yet, it would be entirely
unworkable to demand a Boykin inquiry every time the defense and
prosecution come to some arrangement - through stipulation,
concession or whatever - that narrows the issues for trial. ...

Because prophylactic rules such as Boykin are intended "to
minimize the sum of error costs and administrative costs" of
criminal trials, applying Boykin to concessions that are less than
formal pleas of guilt would, in my judgment, be counter-productive
and eventually lead to abandonment of the rule. Requiring a formal
guilty plea as the trigger for a Boykin inquiry gives the rule a
workable scope and focuses the attention of the court, the counsel
and the defendant on the most serious waiver of rights in a criminal
trial: a defendant's formal acceptance of guilt.
Adams, 968 F.2d at 846-47 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Other federal circuit courts of appeal "are in substantial agreement that
where a defendant has pleaded not guilty and stipulates to evidentiary facts,
even facts crucial to a conviction," neither the due process requirements of
Boykin nor the advisories required by Rule 11 are applicable. People v. Adams,
862 P.2d 831,839 (Cal. 1993) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d
210, 215 (1 st Cir. 1990); United States v. Robertson, 698 F.2d 703, 705 (5 th Cir.
1983); United States v. Stadler, 696 F.2d 59, 60 (8
United States, 633 F.2d 1247, 1250 (6

th

th

Cir. 1980)).

Cir. 1982); Witherspoon

V.

In addition, at least one

state court has held that "[t]he constitution does not compel a full Boykin colloquy
in the absence of a formal guilty plea." State
2009) (citing Adams, 968 F.2d at 841, 845).

V.

Allen, 220 P.3d 245, 248 (Ariz.

Numerous others have similarly

concluded that, unless a factual stipulation is "tantamount to a guilty plea" - i.e. it
admits all of the essential facts or elements necessary for conviction or
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enhancement of the charged crime - there is no constitutional requirement that
the trial court inquire of the defendant and obtain a personal waiver of the right to
a jury determination as to each of the facts covered by the stipulation. See, SUL.,
State v. Humphries, 285 P.3d 917, 923 (Wash. App. 2012) (and cases cited
therein) ("[E]ntry of a stipulation to less than all elements of the offense does not
require the same level of trial court inquiry that would accompany the entry of a
guilty plea."); Commonwealth v. Walorz, 944 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. App. 2011) (no
colloquy required where stipulation was not sufficient, by itself, to sustain
conviction for charged offense); In re Detention of Moore, 216 P.3d 1015, 1020
(Wash. 2009) (En banc) (in a criminal case "due process [does] not require the
trial court to ensure that a defendant understands the rights waived by a factual
stipulation as long as the stipulation is not tantamount to a guilty plea"); People v.
Phillips, 840 N.E.2d 1194, 1203 (III. 2005) ("[I]t is only when counsel's
stipulations render defendant's trial the practical equivalent of a plea of guilty that
a defendant must be personally admonished about the stipulation and must
personally agree to the stipulation." (citations and internal quotations omitted));
People v. Newman, 981 P.2d 98, 103-04 (Cal. 1999) (trial court was not required
to provide constitutional advisements and obtain defendant's waiver before
permitting defendant to stipulate, through counsel, to one element of charged
enhancement; no penal consequences flowed directly from the stipulation, and
the prosecutor still was required to prove the remaining elements of the offense);
Adams, 862 P.2d at 836-39 (defendant's stipulation to some, but not all, of the
evidentiary facts or elements necessary to imposition of punishment on charged

10

enhancement, as opposed to admission to truth of enhancing allegation, did not
trigger Boykin due process requirements).
Idaho's appellate courts have never considered the precise issue raised
by Hochrein in this case. As is evident from the foregoing discussion, however,
the weight of authority from other jurisdictions holds that the due process
protections that are attendant to a guilty plea do not apply to factual stipulations
that admit only some of the facts necessary for conviction of the charged offense
or enhancement.

Pursuant to the factual stipulation in this case, Hochrein

admitted only that, on January 28, 2010, a no contact order was in effect that
prohibited Hochrein both from contacting Tanya Lewis and from being at her
residence. (State's Trial Exhibit 3A) Conspicuously absent from the stipulation
was any admission by Hochrein that he actually violated that order by engaging
in the prohibited contact.

(Compare State's Trial Exhibit 3A with #38317 R.,

p.151 (elements instruction requiring state to prove Hochrein violated the no
contact order "by going within 200 feet of Tanya Lewis' residence").)

In fact,

Hochrein specifically disputed this essential element of the crime through the
presentation of three alibi witnesses (see generally Trial Tr., pp.225-70) and his
trial counsel's argument that Hochrein never had contact with Ms. Lewis on the
date charged (see generally Trial Tr., pp.133-141, 303-27).
Because Hochrein exercised his right to a jury trial, and because the
stipulation at issue admitted only some, but not all, of the elements necessary for
a conviction of the charged offense, the trial court was not required, before
accepting the stipulation, to advise Hochrein of his constitutional rights and
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obtain a personal waiver thereof.

~,People

v. Little, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 446, 455

(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("[Because a stipulation to some but not all of the
elements of a crime or enhancement has no penal consequences comparable to
those that flow from a confession or guilty plea, such a stipulation does not raise
the constitutional concerns that prompted the [Boykin] requirements, especially
when the defendant who makes the stipulation also asserts his or her right to a
trial and waives no constitutional rights." (Citation omitted)). In addition, because
the stipulation was "entered into the record in open court in the presence of
[Hochrein], and [was] agreed to by [Hochrein's] acknowledged counsel, the trial
court [could] reasonably assume that [Hochrein was] aware of the content of the
stipulation and agree[d] to it through his ... attorney." Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d at
836. Hochrein has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court violated
any of his unwaived constitutional rights by not requiring a personal waiver in
open court from Hochrein.
Hochrein has also failed to show that the error he alleges "plainly exists
(without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision)." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Hochrein argues that the
error he claims is plain due to the "absence of any valid waiver, made personally
and on the record by Mr. Hochrein" in this case. (Supp. brief, p.?) Because, as
discussed above, due process does not require a trial court to conduct an onthe-record inquiry and obtain from a defendant a personal waiver of the right to a
jury determination of the facts contained in a stipulation that admits only some
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elements of the charged offense, Hochrein has failed to show any error at all,
much less one that is plain. Nor can Hochrein show from the record that trial
counsel's decision to enter into the stipulation and submit it to the jury, without
first requiring the trial court to conduct an on-the-record inquiry and obtain from
Hochrein a personal waiver of his right to a jury determination of the facts
admitted to in the stipulation, was anything but sound trial strategy.
Unlike the decision to waive a jury trial, which rests solely with a criminal
defendant, see State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 965-66, 703 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Ct.
App. 1985), the decision to enter into factual stipulations that narrow the issues
for trial falls squarely within the realm of tactical decisions that trial counsel has
the discretion to make, SUL., Adams, 862 P.2d at 836 ("Evidentiary stipulations
have long been recognized as tactical trial decisions which counsel has
discretion to make without the express authority of the client." (citations
omitted»; Phillips, 840 N.E.2d at 1204-05 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
745, 751-52 (1983» ('''Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have
emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments and focusing at
most on a few key issues."'); People v. Clendenin, 939 N.E.2d 310, 325 (III.
2010) (decision by defense counsel to proceed by stipulation, while still
preserving a defense, was matter of trial tactics and strategy).

Indeed, as

observed by one court:
Since an evidentiary stipulation is, in effect, nothing more than an
acknowledgement of what a witness would testify to if called, and a
concomitant decision not to challenge the testimony the witness
would give, a stipulation is not much different from a decision not to
cross-examine.
The notion that a defendant would have to
approve every aspect of defense counsel's cross-examination -
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including "whether and how to conduct cross-examination" highlights the impracticality of [a] procedure [that would require a
defendant, in every conceivable situation, to be advised of the
implications and consequences of a stipulation and to approve it on
the record].
Phillips, 840 N.E.2d at 1202-03 (emphasis original); accord Adams, 862 P.2d at
836 ("If it really follows from Boykin that every purported waiver of every
constitutional right must be affirmatively shown to have been personally and
intelligently made by the client, it would be necessary to stop the proceedings
and have a hearing on that question every time the attorney declines to crossexamine a witness or fails to object to inadmissible evidence." (Citations and
internal quotations omitted)).
The stipulation entered into by defense counsel in this case narrowed the
issues for trial to the only contested element of the crime, that being whether
Hochrein had contact with Tanya Lewis in violation of the no contact order. That
defense counsel chose to stipulate to the existence and validity of the no contact
order rather than requiring the state to present evidence as to these facts is
hardly surprising since there can be no doubt that the state could easily have
proved the fact of the no contact order by calling one or more foundational
witnesses and introducing the order as an exhibit. Moreover, by stipulating to the
fact of the no contact order, defense counsel likely kept out of evidence other
potentially prejudicial information, including the details of an intimidating a
witness charge that led to the issuance of the order.

(See #38317 Prelim.

Hearing Exhibit 4 (no contact order indicating Hochrein had "been charged with
or convicted of' intimidating a witness, Tanya Lewis)); see Phillips, 840 N.E.2d at
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1201 ("As a matter of trial strategy, defense counsel might choose to stipulate to
evidence in an effort to minimize the adverse impact it will have at trial."). From
this record, Hochrein cannot show that trial counsel's decision to enter the
stipulation and focus exclusively on establishing an alibi defense was anything
but a tactical decision.
Finally, Hochrein has failed to demonstrate prejudice. See Perry, 150
Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980 (third prong of fundamental error test requires
defendant to show that claimed error "was not harmless"). Hochrein argues that
the error he claims is structural, and therefore not subject to harmless error
analysis, because "[i]n the case of a factual stipulation that relieves the State of
its burden of proof as to every element, because the stipulation is the only
'evidence" on the issue, there could be no verdict as to every element of the
State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of the
stipulation." (Supp. brief, p.8 (emphasis added).) Hochrein's argument fails on
its premise because as discussed above, and as even Hochrein concedes on
appeal, the stipulation in this case admitted only some, not all, of the elements
the state was required to prove to secure a conviction on the violation of a no
contact order charge.

(See Supp. brief, pp.4, 9 (stipulation covered "several

elements" of charged offense).)
For this same reason, Hochrein cannot demonstrate actual prejudice.
Hochrein does not contend that he actually misunderstood the stipulation, that
he had insufficient time to discuss it with counsel, that he was unaware of its
effect, or even that entered into it, through counsel, other than knowingly,
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voluntarily and intelligently.

Because Hochrein's rights to a jury trial and due

process were not even implicated by the stipulation that admitted only some of
the elements of the crime and that was entered into by defense counsel on
Hochrein's behalf and in his presence, the district court was not required to
obtain from Hochrein any on-the-record assurance that Hochrein's decision to
enter into the stipulation was voluntary.

See Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d at 836.

Hochrein has failed to establish any error at all, let alone any prejudicial error
that affected the outcome of the proceedings. Hochrein's claim of fundamental
error thus fails on all three prongs of Perry, and this Court must decline to review

it.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon jury verdicts finding Hochrein guilty of felony violation of a no contact order
and being a persistent violator.
th

DATED this 5 day of November 2012.
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